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1 Introduction
Ad hoc networks have the potential to increase the flexibility of wireless communication systems. They,
however, also require novel operating principles. In particular, due to the absence of fixed infrastructure,
most of the functions (routing, mobility management, in some cases even security) rely on the cooperation
between the nodes.
In civilian scenarios, the selfishness of the participants might be a motivation for non-cooperation.
Over the last few years, several researchers have proposed incentive techniques to encourage nodes to
collaborate, be it by making use of a reputation system [2, 6], or by relating the right to benefit from the
network to the contribution to the common interest of a node provided thus far [3]. These proposals have
been based on heuristics, and are therefore rather difficult to compare with each other. Srinivasan et al.
[7] have proposed a formal framework, based on game theory, to study cooperation with the emphasis on
energy-efficiency. They have identified the conditions under which cooperation is a Nash equilibrium3.
In our paper, we also study the case, where no incentive mechanisms are implemented in the nodes. We
identify the conditions for the existence of cooperation. Our main contribution is to show that cooperative
Nash equilibria are much more likely to exist with mobile than with static nodes. In addition, we quantify
how much “generosity” the nodes need to proovide in order to make these equilibria feasible. An extended
version of the paper is provided in [5].
2 Model and results
We assume a network of N nodes. Each node uses an omni-directional antenna with the same radio
range. Hence, there is a bi-directional communication link between two nodes if they reside within the
radio range of each other.
We model packet forwarding as a game of infinite duration, where each node (as a player) interacts
with the rest of the network. Inspired by [1], we call Generous Tit-For-Tat (GTFT) a strategy that
overestimates the required contribution to the network. Thus, a node playing this strategy is generous,
because it is willing to contribute more to the network than to benefit from it. If a node i plays the
GTFT strategy, it uses the strategy constant gi that stands for the generosity of the node.
We divide the time in discrete steps. At the end of each time step, each node evaluates the results of
its interaction with the network. The length of the time step (meaning the evaluation period) is correlated
with the amount of network change. The longer the time step is, the more mobility changes the network.
Thus, we can use the length of the time step as a parameter to study the effect of mobility.
We simulated a realistic network as follows. First, we place 100 nodes with uniform probability in
a toroid simulation area of 1.5km2. Then, we generate a connection for every node with the average
number of relays ¯`. Then, we let every node send a packet on the connection for which it is the source.
We repeat this procedure for the number of steps. We regenerate a new connection only if the old one
3 In a Nash equilibrium none of the nodes can increase its utility by unilaterally changing its strategy.
breaks due to mobility. We apply the random waypoint mobility model with an average speed of 10 m/s
and an average pause time of 10 s.
We investigate the effect of mobility on cooperation. We increase the step duration exponentially
and we observe the required generosity level that ensures that 95 % of the simulations result in full
cooperation (we call this value the generosity threshold). Figure 1 presents the generosity threshold as
a function of the duration of a step (which represents the effect of mobility). We see that if the length
of one step is small (meaning that mobility is small), then a higher generosity threshold is required.
The higher the mobility is, the lower the generosity threshold is. This result is fully consistent with our
previous work [4]: The absence of mobility is a major hurdle for “spontaneous” cooperation.
Generosity is needed for nodes that are relays in a higher number of connections than the average
number of relays on the connections. This situation represents the worst case for a node. If the duration
of the step is small, then this worst case situation is valid for several steps and the node has to be more
generous to cope with the cumulative effect of the situation. If mobility increases (meaning that the
topology of the network changes more between the steps), then the duration of a worst case situation is
shorter and less generosity is required to cope with its cumulative effect.
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Figure 1. Generosity threshold ensuring full cooperation as a function of the duration of one step (i.e., the effect
of mobility)
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